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Cold War: incommensurability and its
discontents from Fuller’s Tale of
Harvard to Fleck’s Unsung Lvov
BABETTE E. BABICH

If Thomas Kuhn ever truly understood it or not, he certainly could not abide the
extraordinary influence that was and is the conceptual legacy of his The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions. For Steve Fuller, author of Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History
for Our Times, this diffidence was not a character flaw but the literally venerable sign
of sanctity. As a ‘saint’, to use Fuller’s expression, Kuhn renounces the fame and the
influence he had won, condemning it, sicut palia, as straw, ashes—all that stuff to
which so many mere mortals would aspire. I am charmed by this interpretation if
it does not entirely persuade me. This is not just because I do not share Fuller’s
(only relatively closeted) enthusiasm for values, religious and otherwise.1 Rather, as
I shall argue, Kuhn himself never grasped what he had wrought: not because the
ideas of genius here exceeded (as they often exceed) the individual of genius, but,
and quite routinely, because they weren’t altogether Kuhn’s ideas in the first
place.
Fuller is more than a little cavalier in his reference to thinkers and their
associated expert contexts so that apart from Kuhn and Conant (in the context of
an admirably Peyton Place style reading of an erstwhile Cambridge, Mass.
experience) Fuller is not as fair as he might be. Thus from Koyré to Yates to Mach
(but excluding Planck and Duhem, both of whom Fuller seems to like) but also
Mannheim and Gombrich and most worrisomely, Feyerabend (who was, for many
years, my own good friend and correspondent), Fuller evinces a storyteller’s
smoothness but insufficient exigence. Thus, for example, Fuller reduces Feyerabend to a pastiche of his ‘Anything goes’ slogan.2 And he does this largely to avoid
the dangers of that same ‘irrationalism’ to which Feyerabend openly ‘converted’
(Fuller 2000, p. 304). But Fuller owes Feyerabend a bit more than this for Fuller’s
social–historical reading of Galileo (pp. 187 ff.) is markedly indebted to
Feyerabend, as it also owes something to Patrick A. Heelan. Heelan is a Jesuit
physicist and philosopher of science known to both Fuller and myself from
Heelan’s influence on us in our student days: mine as an undergrad at Stony Brook,
Author: Babette E. Babich, Fordham University, New York City, and Georgetown University,
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Fuller as a grad student whose energy and impatience bemused Heelan during his
short stint as a visiting Fellow at Pittsburgh. If Fuller’s effort to downplay
Feyerabendian associations is an anxious one, in a Bloomian sense, Fuller’s failure
to refer to Heelan is all too routine.3
Rather than here reprising Fuller’s study of Thomas Kuhn (not that I could do
justice to Fuller’s magisterial treatment in such a brief essay and because in any case
redundant in the present context), I examine a single aspect of Fuller’s book for
the sake of a corrective review of the relationship between Ludwik Fleck and
Thomas Kuhn. Fuller, for his part, understates the role of Fleck’s influence on
Kuhn and suggests that, at best, such an influence should be referred to
sociological theories proximally derived from Mannheim and endorsing Thaddeus
Trenn’s account in the English translation of Fleck’s work.4 Because Fuller’s book
is impressively exhaustive, his incidental (i.e. footnote-level) dismissal of Fleck’s
(never very highly touted) influence deserves a bit of re-reading and that is what I
undertake below.5
It was not N.R. Hanson’s point in his description of the differing profiles
presented by the same laboratory for a scientist as contrasted with an extern’s
experience of that same scene, that one’s presuppositions (Hans-Georg Gadamer
calls these one’s ‘prejudices’) influence perception.6 But that influence would be
the hermeneutic point. Such prejudices are the limits of the world one brings to the
world one finds. Philosophers of science tend to be less than receptive to Kuhn and
Kuhn himself internalised that same reception at what must have been a signal
price of considerable cognitive dissonance and as manifest in his person
throughout his life, and we will return to this below. But it was as a philosopher of
science that Robert S. Cohen, a man both influential in philosophy of science and
one quite open to names like Fleck’s (and even Nietzsche’s), could react as he did,
namely with more than a little violence when I once asked him about Kuhn. If Steve
Fuller corrects that, he also surprisingly, i.e. given his own STS interests,
marginalises an exactly social history of science in failing to attend in any detail to
Fleck’s The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact.

1. The ‘Science Wars’—or the Anxiety of Influence: C.I. Lewis vs. Fleck
In what follows, I argue that Kuhn’s limited acknowledgment of Fleck’s influence
on his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was due to a foundational incommensurability between the standard conceptual framework for philosophical studies of
science and Fleck’s historico-social and praxis-oriented approach to scientific
progress. The incommensurability in question constituted an insurmountable
tension between the kind of language and thinking manifest in Fleck’s study and
the conceptual language evident in Kuhn and characteristic of one might still call
the ‘received view’ in philosophy of science. This (ongoing) ‘reception’ of ideas
and language is the reason Fuller attributes the language of ‘incommensurability’7
(or the talk of different ‘worlds’) in the philosophy of science to C.I. Lewis’s tacit
influence.8 It is not irrelevant that this esoteric (or, in this case, insider’s) reference
captures Fuller’s interest to a far greater degree than does Fleck’s more marginal
(and not incidentally outsider’s) role in the philosophy of science. Thus commentary on Fleck tends not to focus on his account of scientific progress but to review
the neglect of this same account. The English-language translation of Fleck’s 1935
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study (1979) only came about in answer to this neglect and it is conceivable that,
had no one noticed the parallels between Fleck’s and Kuhn’s views on the
communal dynamic of scientific practice in Kuhn (1970 [1962]), as German
scholars did do, largely beginning with Wilhelm Baldamus who set Thomas
Schnelle on a research task that became his own life’s work in the process (Schnelle
1982), Fleck’s work might never have seen the light of day in English.9
Fleck’s conception of thought communities (conceived as functioning throughout history as well as contemporaneously in modern scientific research practice),
challenges Western liberal ideas of individualism and freedom.10 Maintaining that
scientific truth is ineluctably social, Fleck takes the disciplinary relevance of
sociology of knowledge to be no less central to an understanding of science than
history itself. Yet adverting to the sociology of science (in particular) or else (more
broadly) to the history of science compounds the troubles of
incommensurability.
Thus it is important that sociology of science per se, apart from distant
disciplinary icons like Robert Merton, but qua sociological studies, qua quintessentially social science, has yet to enjoy an uncontested status vis-à-vis ‘science’ proper,
i.e. natural science. Nor is this particularly remarkable because, historically, the
social sciences in their current ‘scientific’ form are younger than the natural
sciences and were quite conscientiously formed in that same, mathematised
image.11
But and exactly in the wake of the ‘science wars’, sociology has been compelled
to defend itself precisely as a science.12 The history of science itself remains a
methodological and conceptual problem for philosophy of science and the rational
ideal of science because (unlike other ‘social’ studies of science) the history of
science refers very precisely to the way science ‘in fact’ (as one might say) was
generated and how science actually or factually developed in real scientific practice.
But beyond sociological studies and more than anything else, it may be argued, new
approaches to the history of science (deriving from conceptual changes in the
doing of history itself) have begun (although this task is far from complete) to
undermine the standard or received view of analytic philosophy of science.13
In the context of social theories of scientific culture, it is important if not without
controversy, to advert to the camp quality of the Sokal hoax that inaugurated the socalled ‘science wars’ (though who indeed actually fought about anything in any of
these so-called wars remains an unasked question). Although the ‘science wars’
bear directly on Fuller’s reading of Kuhn, Fuller himself makes only oblique
reference to Sokal’s hoax as such.
Throughout the past century, both critics and proponents of science alike have
been invited to accept or receive only what certified scientists endorse as an
authorised definition of science. This, of course, is the joke that originally played in
the staging of the hoax as a game played upon the editors of Social Text—precisely
as an insider’s joke, played on and among friends. In other words, there was no
‘hoax’—properly speaking. The hoax itself was a hoax, a joke, a bit of camp. A
double hoax, Sokal’s hoax was effected by means of an exact ‘in’ on the game. It
is a relevant bit of evidence (or gossip, as I heard it from no one less than Fuller
himself)14 that Sokal was a friend of Social Text editor and meteorological
enthusiast, Andrew Ross, that Sokal met his current wife at a party at Ross’s home—
and that all this is relevant because exactly not nothing follows from such social or
friendly circumstantial evidence. Academics who know editors should know better
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than to think that any kind of vetting or review—blind or expert, humanist or
scientist, or what have you—would or could be at work in such friendly cases.
Almost too trivially good to be true, it wasn’t: the hoax was ‘cooked’—it was a
thoroughly academic set-up.
An overawed confidence in the ultimacy of current physical science is at work in
Sokal’s own presumption (like that of his plainly more accomplished colleague
Steven Weinberg)15 regarding the finished adequacy of science as critically perfect
and quite literally beyond critique. This totalising confidence in science has
sometimes been saddled by critics with a suffix—calling it scientism 16 —to hold it at
a critical distance from more nuanced views on science. But in the context of
philosophy or sociology of science, etc., a charge of scientism is about as much a
reproof as the charge of deism in a religious community. Thus the effect of the
hoax was consummate in and by the (all too moralising) moral of the story and the
same joke continues to work in the wake of the unremittingly monotone
commentary on the story and (surprise, surprise) no one who writes on it can be
found to say anything but ‘how wonderful’17 it was just to think how Sokal rode into
town to show up the postmoderns, the Derrideans, the feminists, the anthropologists and sociologists of science, the social constructivists—at which point, in a
spontaneous reflex of reflexivity, certain scholars are then to be seen busily shoring
up their own legacy by severing their own work from any even putatively or
remotely science-critical perspective.18
The philosopher of science, one can only be led to believe, must eschew critique
if he or she is to be taken as ‘knowing anything’ about science. Thus, in the past,
one has ruled out the philosophical perspective of a Nietzsche or a Heidegger or
even the later Husserl. One cannot be, and one must affirm that one has never
been, a member of any such critical party. It is to his credit that Fuller underlines
the upshot of this ongoing paradigmatic scheme in the philosophy of science
whereby ‘any radical philosophical criticism of science has come to be associated
with irrationalism’ (Fuller 2000, p. 36). And irrationalism, it goes without saying, is
a bad thing.

2. Kuhn: genesis of a paradigm
Famously, and this is why we are able in the insular context of English-language
philosophy of science to quibble about Fleck’s influence on Kuhn in the first place,
Kuhn did indeed read Fleck’s The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (Fleck
1935), as part of his own scholarship and as part of the preparation for his own
work on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1970 [1962]). Because, as Kuhn
reports in retrospect, he read German only ‘badly’, he was compelled, as he also
emphasises, to read and re-read Fleck.19
I read it as of great significance that Kuhn’s encounter with Fleck took place in
an intensifying constellation of ideological circumstances characteristic of the cold
war, an era that today can seem as distant from us as Fleck’s own vanished
Lemberg/Lvov. I read this significance very differently than does Fuller who traces
a patently conservative tack throughout. It is important to stress the difference in
emphasis, for Fuller makes much of the Cold War context of Kuhn’s thought yet
fails to advert to the difference this climate could make in Kuhn’s own terminology
as a transformation of Fleck’s own language.
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Kuhn’s time, the time that generates our own time, spanned prewar and wartime
history and Kuhn’s crucial and formative intellectual work found expression
during the era of the postwar world known as the cold war. In America proper, the
climate of the cold war reflected the still virulent McCarthyism dominating
everything from art to criminal justice and including the academy—or Ivory Tower
as it was then unquaintly regarded. If the McCarthy era in the land of the free and
the brave was not Stalinism, it nevertheless had exactly repressive parallels. Much of
the social and intellectual repression characterising the 1950s and 1960s expressed
this climate of fear. The change that began to take place in the late 1960s (really
into the 1970s and, alas, coming there to an unsung and unmarked dead end) saw
a world change in fashion and life-styles, if not in politics. But if today we no longer
hear about the socialist or communist threat—to use the cold war’s language—that
is not because we have become more nuanced about the psychoanalytic projection
implicit in the language of a ‘communist threat’ or about the multifarious and
complex dimensionality of political forms like socialism or communism, but rather
because like so many of the varied biological species that have become extinct in
the long course of the last century, the threat of socialism/communism has been
vanquished. The end of the cold war corresponds to the extirpation of the political
regimes of socialism and communism itself, almost like the phantasm of democracy
in the US.20 But current political regimes make it plain that we’ve not quite evolved
beyond the inanity of McCarthyism.
Kuhn, it is well known, if also more vigorously asserted in German-language
studies of Fleck’s influence on Kuhn than it is in English contexts, did not fully
credit Fleck’s influence on his work. I argue that Fleck’s influence was collimated
by the word ‘paradigm’ as a term Kuhn used to render that same influence. But,
and this is the heart of the so-called authorial fallacy, words have lives and fortunes
of their own, often alien to their originators, perniciously so in the case of Kuhn’s
‘paradigm’—where one scholar has counted and many more have alluded to the
variety of senses at play in Kuhn’s usage.21
Kuhn, however, had good political reasons for his periphrastic adaptation of
Fleck because the word ‘paradigm’ served for Kuhn to convey what Fleck expressed
by means of ideologically problematic terms like ‘thought collective’ and ‘thought
style’. Fleck’s conceptual schematisation of ‘thought style/collective’ presented
Kuhn with a research palimpsest, interpretive armature, or background structure
for The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, offering Kuhn an exactly deployable
heuristic device for articulating the historical course of scientific change or
revolution in science. As Kuhn himself rightly emphasises in his 1976 introduction
to Fleck’s Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact,22 Kuhn was in need of just such
a structure for his own study—and it was otherwise unavailable.
This genesis also explains why Kuhn himself was never able adequately to specify
the meaning of or to defend or even to understand or accept a conceptual
constellation only first discovered in Fleck.23 It also explains the parallel resistance
to these same ideas in philosophy of science as such. As Lothar Schäfer (1977, p.
25) reflects: ‘keeping Kuhn’s thorough-going dependency on Fleck in mind, one
must draw the obvious conclusion that the key presupposition for [the concept per
se of] revolution in the philosophy of science has to be found in the ahistorical
consciousness’ of philosophy of science.24 This lack of historical sophistication (this
would be Wissenchaftlichkeit in the German sense of the term and internal to the
discipline of history itself) in philosophy of science accounts in many ways for the
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notion of the ‘scientific revolution’ as a ‘fact’ so intriguingly contrary to the
complex dynamic of the empirical history of science.25
It is important to emphasise that I am not claiming a case of intellectual theft. It
is my claim that given the political climate of the 1950s and in spite of the obvious
relevance of Fleck’s study, Kuhn, even had he wished to, could not have invoked Fleck’s
name because Kuhn could not deploy Fleck’s language. Thus to say that Kuhn’s
‘paradigm’ is a periphrastic construction rendering Fleck’s Denkstil/Denkkollektiv
claims not that Kuhn intentionally plagiarised Fleck’s ideas but only that at the
time, and on more than one level, Kuhn could make only such a periphrastic
allusion to Fleck.26
Thus the problem of citing Fleck for Kuhn was not a consequence of Fleck’s
‘Polish-inflected’ German—as Fuller repeats the claim on Kuhn’s behalf, surveying
the historical circumstances of Kuhn’s life and work, this is a misleading assertion
on Kuhn’s part (Fuller 2000, p. 60n)—for there is no ‘false friend’, as language
teachers say, to trip one up in the translation of Denkstil (thought style) or
Denkkollektiv (thought collective). Not a problem of translation but the political
restrictions of Kuhn’s era (from the forties through the fifties and early sixties)
would entail that Kuhn could not adequately refer to Fleck’s terminology. Kuhn in
his 1962 book could not have used such dangerously loaded terms as ‘thought
collectives’—or ‘thought styles’—for the perfectly banal reasons we still attribute
to and name ‘politics’. The language of collectives or thought styles would have
evoked precisely reactive reactions in a time of the paranoia and anxieties expressed
in words like brainwashing, propaganda, the Iron Curtain and the Iron State, and
the inscrutable evil of Eastern Europe, of Russia and (this is all that is left today)
China. And in 1976, the later Kuhn, writing an introduction to the belated
translation of Fleck’s book, remained careful to underscore his personal, exactly
gut distance from these very same terms. Even after so much time, one may hear
the echo of Western anxiety vis-à-vis the image of the ‘collective’ as the antiindividualist, veritably mindless, socialist ‘horde’.
In this way, the then-times themselves engendered the unhappy coinage of the
term paradigm—among whatever other reasons there may also have been for the
term. This same historical echo reverberates through Kuhn’s own revealingly
overfrank, at times uncomprehending, sometimes brittle autobiographical reflections. And in The Road Since Structure, in Kuhn’s interview with Aristides Baltas,
Kostas Gavroglu, and Vassili Kindi, even the most hermeneutically impoverished
reader must note the relevance of Kuhn’s most repeated word ‘anger’ (Kuhn 2000,
pp. 255–323)—articulating his actions in terms of a fundamental, choleric
impatience. This reflexive reaction to his own academic legacy does not contradict
as much as it complements the contextual circumstances (or very Fleckian
‘genesis’) of Kuhn’s book, as Fuller outlines it in his own study of Kuhn and the
development of Kuhn’s own influence in the broader culture of the academy
itself.27
In this context, it is worth recalling the anecdote that Kuhn found significant
enough to dedicate a great proportion of his own brief introduction to Fleck to
retelling it. Kuhn reports that his own mentor, Harvard President James Bryant
Conant, who became US High Commissioner for Germany, referred to the German
title of Fleck’s book, Die Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftliche Tatsache, in
conversation with a German associate, after Kuhn had related his discovery of Fleck
to him. For Conant, the borrowed reference backfired, as such borrowed
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references often do in transcultural contexts. Conant’s German associate responded to the mention of the title of Fleck’s work with a spontaneous denunciation of
the concept as such: recoiling from its titular proposition in a bravely, determinedly
naı̈ve positivism that is the unchanged ideal of philosophy of science, latterly called
realism, then betrayed by the stolid conviction that the-facts-are-the-facts. By
definition, as Conant’s Teutonic interlocutor painstakingly instructed him, and
hence contra the concept of Entstehung and Entwicklung—the one thing Tatsachen or
‘facts’ did not as such have was anything like a ‘genesis’ and the last thing they are
able to do is ‘develop’. Facts are just ‘discovered’ as what they plainly are.
Sidestepping such debacles, Kuhn eschewed Fleck’s terminology and he spoke
instead of paradigms and paradigm shifts, of normal and of revolutionary
science.28
The debate that is often gathered under the rubric of the two cultures continues
(Fuller makes reference to it), but common analyses of the divide between these
cultures inevitably miss the issues at stake.29 The problem is what I’ve been calling
incommensurability, it is, to switch paradigmatic reference from Fleck to my own
studies of Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s philosophic inquiry into science and
technology, what Nietzsche claims as the limits between what one can see or know
(via what one brings to an inquiry from the outset [Babich 1999a; cf. 1994]) and
the upshot of this perspectival constraint for one’s capacity for new knowledge, that
is, nothing less than scientific discovery.
Language, paradigm, thought style—all are words for such world making (and
breaking) limitations. But to exceed a limitation, one must first take account of it.
The blindered style of the ‘received view’ in philosophy of science has proven to be
singularly incapable of such a reflexive critique. The great achievement of Fuller’s
book is that it points to the importance of social studies of science and technology,
including history and hermeneutics. To this extent, Fuller stands in the same
tradition as Fleck and possibly even Nietzsche, if it is also true that Fuller’s omission
of Fleck (and so many other names) betrays the Todschweigerei that is the other side
of censorship. A more inclusive account would seem a liberating, no: an enlightening
prospect for the future of science and technology studies as for philosophy of
science.
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See Fuller (2002).
See Fuller (2000, pp. 121 and 304); see, however, p. 212 for an ameliorating note.
Fuller refers to Heelan’s work on perception (Heelan 1983) in a note on Fuller (2000, p. 53).
Trenn (1979). Oddly, enough, Fuller would almost do the same for Mannheim’s influence on Fleck
as he does for that of Fleck on Kuhn as Fuller makes much of the fact that Fleck does not expressly
allude to Mannheim (2000, p. 60n). But, of course, as a strong proponent of Science and
Technology Studies (his chapter VII is all about this, under the rubric of ‘Kuhnification as ritualised
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political impotence’, Fuller, pp. 318–378), Fuller knows better. Today’s English-language practice of
documentation (Social Science style or otherwise) is not the only way of making references (esoteric
allusion seems to be a national sport for the French, for one notorious contemporary example), but
and, in general, references that are common knowledge are not commonly tied to a specific name,
especially where such a limitation would have been inaccurate.
Note, however, that Fuller wavers in this conviction of the lesser relevance of Fleck’s importance for
Kuhn when he refers to Gustave Le Bon’s invention of mass psychology (Fuller 2000, p. 295n), and
perhaps he wavers as he does because he shares certain claims (or sympathies) with the original
‘professional sociologists’ (as Fuller denominates them) who first reviewed Fleck’s book and were
‘disturbed by his use of the term “collective”, with its strong industrial socialist overtones’ (Fuller
2000, p. 211n).
See my introductory essay discussing Patrick Heelan’s work in the philosophy of quantum physics for
a discussion of this example referring to both Hanson and Gadamer in the context of objectivity and
phenomenology (Babich 2002b). See Toulmin (2002) for a discussion of Gadamer and Heelan.
By incommensurability here and in what follows, I refer to the simple badness of fit between Fleck’s
terminology and conceptual schemata in related areas of the philosophy of science, per se. This is
also the sense in which Alasdair MacIntyre (1981, p. 8 ff.) speaks of ‘conceptual incommensurability’ and the general sense in which Hacking (1983, pp. 12–14) characterises it precisely with
reference to Kuhn. I thus do not refer to the more specialised use of the term and the
correspondingly vast literature addressed to it in analytic philosophy and philosophy of science (just
for a start, see Hacking’s own reference list (Hacking 1983, p. 278), in addition to Fuller’s own
discussion, scattered throughout his study, but esp. Fuller (2000, pp. 201–202) and on C.I. Lewis,
Fuller (2000, p. 266 ff, and particularly p. 271)).
Fuller can do this as noted above, rather than refer to Heidegger, who uses similar language, or
Husserl or else Wittgenstein or even Nietzsche, because Fuller is talking about a possible influence
on the very specific and very exclusive conceptual world that is that of the philosophy of science.
For his part, Baldamus (1979, p. 232) explains the sociological process of the dissemination of ideas
from Fleck to Kuhn as follows: ‘Als schließlich die Bedeutung Flecks von Kuhn entdeckt wurde,
führte dessen eigenmächtige Verarbeitung des Fleckschen Gedankenguts zu einem verblüffenden
Rezeptionserfolg. Indem Kuhn aus dem Werk Flecks nur solche Bestandteile übernahm, die sich
sinngemäß den Bedürfnissen der sechziger Jahre anpassen ließen, wurde jene Kritik [gemeint ist
Flecks radikale Kritik an der zeitgenössischen Wissenschaftsphilosophie] entschärft und dadurch im
Prinzip erst diskutabel, d. h. rezeptionsfähig’.
In opposition to the contemporary Western cultural emphasis on the scientific genius, as Fleck
himself observes: ‘scientists, most frequently individualists, do not want to see the collective nature
of thinking. What would remain of their renowned genius?’ (Fleck, 1986 [1947], p. 151). For this
reason, Fleck’s critical notion of thought collectives, as intrinsic to the progress of science as such,
contradicts the dominant, historically ideological ideal of scientific genius and the achievement of
Western liberal individualism. See Harré (2002) and Ziman (2002); see also Ziman (1995). But,
beyond this, see further Golinski (1998).
Kockelmans (1975) has explored the relation between the conception of science within the natural
and social sciences, to show that, however counterintuitively for some, the natural sciences
constitute not only the theoretical paradigm for the social sciences but the historical precedent for
the same. The social sciences are not more primitive or less developed versions of the natural
sciences and are thus not developmentally prior to them. This also means that such sciences ought
not be expected to evolve increasingly more mathematical or logicised variants of themselves in the
future.
See, for example, studies offering a sociology of ‘laboratory life’ or the ‘manufacture of knowledge’.
See Bruno Latour’s more or less uncomprehending, certainly pained efforts to make his own proscience orientation as clear as possible (Latour, 1999).
For an instanciation of this new trend internal to the philosophy of science (qua logical empiricism)
see Giere and Richardson (1996) as well as Friedman (1999, 2000); for earlier examples directed to
history of science as such, see Cohen (1994), Crombie (1952), Hacking (1992), and Jardine (1991).
Fuller discusses and critiques Butterfield’s legacy in Fuller (2000, pp. 23ff.)
I take this report, a perfect piece of gossip, on perfect faith. Hearsay is hearsay.
See for a specific discussion of this credulity—and its limits—MacIntyre (1999), pp. xv–xvii.
Sorrel (1991).
How could it happen that scientists not be asked to vet an article on science—as if the evening news
did not constantly present scientists happily saying speculative things about genetic engineering or
evolution unmasked or debunked by other scientists just as happily as misleading, overstated, and
even erroneous. See for an overview and fuller discussion, Babich (2002a); an earlier version
appeared as Babich (1997).
Hacking (1999); Latour (1999).
Note that Kuhn’s self-deprecation indicates a language competence that itself requires a
hermeneutic articulation, different from the circumstance that is rather more common among
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today’s American philosophers who cannot read German at all. In the same way, we note Kuhn also
reports that he likewise read and spoke French very haltingly, a facility which was likewise different
from illiteracy, as his own autobiographical reflections make clear in his recollection of his time
during and after World War II in France where what he, as a military expert, was able to do then
required just as much ability in French as he similarly disavows with a scientist’s characteristic
diffidence—a point of self-deprecating irony further attested by the praise of the quality of his
French which he received from Parisians.
This insight is hardly a resultant of recent events, but it is now unmistakable in the wake of the
dramatic demonstration of the limits of that same image of ‘democracy’ afforded by the very events
of the 2000 US presidential election and judicial decision regarding the undecided results of the
same. This continues now in the wake of the terrorist attach of 9/11 and the complex global politics
between American and Islamic cultures.
Masterman (1970). Fuller himself coins the word ‘paradigmatitis’ to take the consequences of this
famously labile term a bit further afield (2000, p. 318).
See too the more comprehensive introduction by Schäfer and Schnelle in Fleck (1980, pp. vii–
xlvii).
This would mean, to oppose the reading expressed by Schäfer (1977) in his reflections on Fleck’s
reception by comparison with Kuhn’s own influence, that at the very least, such a reliance shows less
Kuhn’s prescience than his opportunism.
Schäfer thus explicates the very problem of contemporary analytic philosophy of science as the
dominant thought style possible in and for philosophy of science (Wissenschaftstheorie). For Schäfer,
Kuhn is little more than Fleck’s more marketable (or, as Baldamus expressed it: rezeptionsfähig)
epigone. See Schäfer (1977).
See Cohen (1994) as well as Hacking (1992) and, as if to prove that this reduces to textbook level
cliché, Shapin (1996). It is important to note that the ‘very idea’ of the history of science remains
conceptually problematic in the context of the history of science—and in many ways, it continues
to be so, if we are to believe Jardine’s mild and all-too-conservative warning (Jardine 2000 [1991]),
and we should. A recent review of the disciplinary relationship between the philosopy of science and
the history of science shows that this tension remains—although it is manifestly clear that the
philosophy of science can no longer insist, as a reconstructivist perspective could argue (to wit,
Lakatos’s famous quip), that it is all to the worse for science if it does not in historical fact accord
with theoretical accounts of the logic of scientific discovery or invention. And if talk of thought
collectives and thought styles was problematic, to combine the former with the idea of the history
(specifically, fatally, expressed as the genesis and development) of a fact was exactly shocking to the
logical mindset of the philosophy of science.
Kuhn could not credit Fleck beyond his famous prefatory characterisation of Fleck’s book as ‘an
essay that anticipates many of my own ideas’ and situating those same ‘ideas’ in what Kuhn (1970,
p. vii) called ‘the sociology of the scientific community’. To the great disappointment of students of
sociology of science, it is intriguing that (but Fuller himelf despite his brief for STS neglects to
discuss this) Kuhn ultimately failed to specify or further to expand upon this allusion to the
‘sociology of the scientific community’.
Fuller (2000).
As Fleck’s notion of thought style implies, and just as Nietzsche argues, Kuhn could find in Fleck
only what he had eyes to see, or ears to listen for. Hence, what exceeded Kuhn’s capacity for
understanding he simply overlooked. Kuhn’s mistake lay—and with regard to Fleck I contend that
he had only one mistake, it was also singularly pernicious—in assuming that the history and
sociology of ideas was a properly established or developed discipline with a patent and received
structure. A scientist by training and not a historian, Kuhn could not have guessed that nothing
could be further from the truth in the social dynamic one author has famously dramatised as the
‘two cultures’ and the still enduring abyss between the same.
See my essay expressing this debate in terms of the analytic continental divide interior to
professional philosophy Babich (2003b).
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